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Abstract 
This article deals with establishing and discussing the concept of magic circle - 
often  present  in  game  studies  -  and  ponder  the  possible  relations  with  the 
concept of liminality, worked in cultural anthropology from the rites of passage 
standpoint  in  Van  Gennep  and  Victor  Turner  and  with  the  concept  of 
transitional phenomenon by psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott. Towards that, we 
seek references in studies of the respective areas of knowledge, in order to 
reflect  on  the  experience  of  play.  The  establishment  of  the  relationship 
between  the  concepts  mentioned  -  magic  circle,  liminality,  transitional 
phenomenon - takes a step forward on the path that seeks to answer what 
play is and its relevance in contemporary life. Thus, given the large access to 
digital  games  today,  this  article  provides  a  relevant  contribution  to 
Communication studies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The theme of the magic circle is central to the theme of games in general and 
digital  games,  in  particular,  among  other  things,  because  it  helps  us  think 
about the concept of  game and its extensions in everyday life. Similarly, the 
concept of liminality can be a light to  understanding online and offline life, as 
well  as  the  idea  of  transitional  phenomenon  can  be  useful  for  a  better 
understanding  of  the  game  experience.  To  discuss  these  issues,  we  will 
gradually bring in the concepts and weave their points of relationship. In the 
research  on  digital  games,  the  theme  of  the  magic  circle  is  referenced  in  a 
paragraph in the beginning of Huizinga’s still necessary book Homo Ludens. 
Presented in the book Rules of Play (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004), the concept, 
in  that  context,  was  also  influenced  by  the  works  of  Apter  and  Sniderman, 
according to Stenros (2012). Moreover, Zimmerman himself, in a text of 2012 
in the Gamasutra gaming website, stated that the concept of magic circle was 
more or less invented by him and Salen for the book, from Huizinga (1938) 
and Callois (1958)
14, but reformulated in terms of design and semiotics. 
Understood, since then, by games scholars as a metaphor, the term “magic 
circle” has suffered a number of criticisms in recent years. 
Stenros (2012), for instance, starting from the ideas of Calleja, understands 
that Huizinga uses the term not only as a metaphor, but as a key feature of 
the examples of games that he mentions in Homo Ludens. 
Aiming at a more rigorous analysis to deal with this issue, Stenros proposes in 
the same article a reading of the topic from other different perspectives. For 
some  authors  mentioned  in  the  book,  the  concept  is  understood  from  the 
player’s  personal  mentality  (psychological  bubble  of  play),  for  others  the 
concept  stands  as  a  signed  social  contract  that  creates  a  game.  In  a  third 
approach, the magic circle is understood as the arena based on space, time or 
product on which play takes place. 
We will try to discuss different perspectives well discussed by Stenros (2012), 
that relate the social perspective with classical authors of Anthropology (Van 
Gennep 1909, Turner, 1974) and the personal approach of the player with the 
concept of transitional phenomenon wrought by Winnicott (1975) in 1951 and 
by a socio-anthropological reflection of Da Matta (2000). 
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14 In this book, at least in its English translation, we did not find the expression magic circle. 
Caillois, Roger (1958): Les jeux et les hommes. English translation (2001): Man, Play and Games. 
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2. THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A QUESTIONER OF THE BOUNDARIES 
OF PLAY 
The expression magic circle appears in six different contexts in the Brazilian 
Portuguese translation of the book Homo Ludens, and this was also found by 
Finnish author Stenros (2012) in the English version. As the latter points out, 
only three of the quotes are brought by games scholars when dealing with the 
theme: as (1) a material or ideally marked place, (2) as a metaphor, or (3) as 
sacred space (as opposed to the play space). As this is the original source of 
debate  around  the  theme  of  game  studies,  we  surveyed  the  expression  in 
Huizinga’s book. 
In reviewing the occurrence of the expression, we find that the first time that 
magic circle appears in the text refers to the places in which the game takes 
place. However, Huizinga warns that these “places” refer to spaces and times 
of  material  or  imaginary  nature  (p.  11).  In  the  second  occurrence  of  the 
expression,  the  emphasis  is  on  the  problem  of  “breaking  the  illusion”  as 
disarranging the game itself
15 (p. 12). In the third occurrence it equates the 
game with the sacred, when he writes that “from a formal point of view, there 
is no difference between the delimitation of a space for sacred purposes and 
the same operation for the purpose of simple game” (p. 18). He also discusses 
(p. 45), the circular shape of the Mahabharata, stating that “the circle as such, 
however, is of magical significance”. Ahead (p. 59), however, he explains that 
“no matter if it is square or round, in any way it is always a magic circle, an 
enclosure  of  play  within  which  the  common  different  categories  of  men  are 
temporarily abolished” in clear proximity with ritual activities. Later in the end 
of  the  book  (p.151-152)  he  reworks  the  idea  of  the  magic  circle,  and  from 
there we can draw his conclusion in the form of “cheap metaphor” - as he calls 
it – “everything is play”. With this statement, in the context of the paragraph 
we believe that he means that the world really is not serious, because we are 
limited  to  understanding  it  only  with  reason:  we’re  all  playing  and  being 
played. 
From our brief analysis of the occurrence of the concept in Homo Ludens, we 
can  understand  why  this  has  generated,  and  still  generates,  many 
comprehension difficulties. Besides being in a field close to the highly complex 
game concept, we must agree that Huizinga's text is not easy to read for the 
uninitiated in Philosophy. 
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From  now  on  we  will  discuss  the  different  meanings  that  this  concept  took, 
focusing on building a theoretical base for the study of digital games. 
When  Huizinga  uses  the  term  magic  circle,  it  is  clear  that  he  does  not 
understand it exclusively as a physical boundary, but also as something that 
can  be  marked  in  ideas,  as  he  states  that  these  can  be  imaginary  places, 
therefore, not delimited materially. As imaginary places, the concept is used as 
a metaphor. 
However, in other passages, the concept of magic circle is not a metaphor, but 
the name of one of the locations in which the game takes place. This is evident 
when he writes (p. 18) “the racetrack, the tennis court, the chessboard or the 
hopscotch do not distinguish themselves formally from the temple or the magic 
circle.”  Well,  let  us  not  forget  that  the  magic  circle,  as  a  spatially  confined 
place,  is  the  site  of  the  rituals  in  which  something  mythical  and  sacred 
happens. 
In our initial reading of Rules of Play (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004) - if not the 
first, one of the first books that discuss the magic circle in digital games - this 
was an issue that seems to have demanded a lot of reflection from the authors. 
Understanding games (digital or not) as social systems as well as objects that 
represent social systems (be they real or idealized), in the final chapters they 
conclude that, depending on the perspective in which the games are perceived, 
they will be more open or more closed: if the focus is in the rules, tend to be 
regarded as closed systems, if understood as cultural artifacts, they are open 
systems. So, for them, the games are nonetheless open and closed systems. 
Still, for Salen & Zimmerman, despite the permeability of the magic circle of 
the  game,  understood  as  a  cultural  object,  the  game  continues  to  be  an 
artificial object. According to Stenros (2012, p. 2) to the authors of Rules of 
Play,  although  the  boundaries  of  the  game  are  fuzzy  and  permeable,  its 
boundaries  are  more  formal,  and  “the  possible  development  of  play  from 
culture is not relevant.” While we consider this criticism to be somewhat too 
strong,  since  the  authors  are  dedicated  to  arguing  about  the  relationship 
between play and culture, we cannot deny that, as a conclusion, perhaps at the 
urging of a definitive answer, they say that the games are artificial. 
If games are not separated from the rest of culture, are they still really 
artificial?  Yes.  Calling  games  artificial  does  not  mean  they  are  totally 
distinct from culture. Regardless of how games can be integrated into the OBRA	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culture, there will always be some aspect of the operation of a game that 
relies  on  its  own  system,  instead  of  culture,  to  create  meaning  for 
players. (Salen & Zimmerman, 2012, p.102) 
Recapturing  the  central  debate  on  the  magic  circle,  we  bring  back  Stenros 
(2012),  that  in  his  review  of  the  literature  on  the  subject,  says  that  the 
conceptualization  of  Salen  &  Zimmerman  has  faced  strong  criticism,  mostly 
because  many  scholars  feel  the  division  between  play  and  ordinary  life  is 
ultimately  invalid. The author in question bases himself, among others things, 
in the criticisms by Taylor (2006) from ethnographic exploration of the culture 
of online games. Other works, including interviews and observations from hard 
core players in their own homes (Pargman & Jacobsson, 2008), have pointed to 
the absence of a clear and closed boundary between play and everyday life, 
according to Stenros. 
Although, really, the empirical evidence of the openness of online games to 
everyday  life,  may  be  an  important  contribution  to  the  debate  on  the 
separation between online and offline worlds, we must situate this discussion 
within the history of philosophical reflections on this issue. Among others, we 
understand  that  Huizinga  (2000,  p.  11)  defines  magic  circle  as  “temporary 
worlds within the ordinary world,” and makes it clear that it is not “another 
world.” Anyway, Stenros makes us see that Taylor's position, questioning the 
division between play and life, can be an important element in the discussion 
on  the  separation  between  online  and  offline  life,  and  it  calls  for  a  non-
dichotomous model, in our view, that is still too difficult to build. 
However,  our  opinion  is  that,  as  digital  games  become  better  accepted  by 
contemporary culture in general, disruptive understandings will be replaced by 
a better understanding of digital games (virtual world) as an extension of the 
material world (real). 
Still Stenros (2012) in his detailed review of the topic, brings the observation 
by  Malaby  (2007)  on  the  criticisms  by  Marinka  Copier  (2005),  saying  that, 
while  Huizinga  understands  the  magic  circle  as  a  sacred  space,  Salen  & 
Zimmerman transform it into a chalk circle from a child's play. What seems to 
bother  Copier  in  the  representation  of  Salen  &  Zimmerman  is  the  physical 
demarcation between what is play and non-play. Another researcher, Sybille 
Lammes (2006 apud Stenros 2012), sees the metaphor of the magic circle as a 
simplification of play and world. OBRA	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Some authors, while investigating Stenros (2012), have proposed other terms 
to speak of the boundaries between play and not-play, between a synthetic or 
online  world  and  what  does  not  happen  in  it.  Instead  of  magic  circle  they 
suggest:  magic  knot  (Lammes,  2006),  puzzle  piece  (Juul,  2008)  and 
membrane (Castronova, 2005). If the magic circle is the privileged metaphor in 
game studies, other areas use other metaphors such as: world, frame, screen, 
zone, environment and net. 
In  philosophy  it  is  common  to  find  the  word  “world”  (Riezler,  1941  apud 
Stenros,  2012;  Heidegger,  1928;  Fink,  1960).  While  Riezler  makes  a  clear 
distinction between the game world and the ordinary world, Heidegger and Fink 
bring them together. Bateson (1955) uses the idea of a “frame” as a kind of 
mental representation that keeps the player aware of the fact that he is “just 
playing.” Goffman (1961 apud Stenros, 2012) took Bateson's frame metaphor 
to the social and cultural context, distinguishing what is relevant and what is 
irrelevant  when  the  player  plays  and  understood  everyday  life  as  similar  to 
games. For example, when the player plays, his social status outside the game 
does not affect the play of the game; inside what matters most are the rules 
that govern it. 
In addition to choosing new concepts, we wonder: as play takes up more space 
in our everyday lives - as it penetrates the rigid structure of the world of work 
-  and  the  production  of  genres  of  pervasive  and  online  games,  would  it  be 
better understood as a “mundane” therefore no longer artificial and detached 
from everyday life? We can go a little further into this discussion, pointing out 
some reflections to help us out of this mess. 
 
3. THE INTERTWINING OF PLAY AND WORLD 
Fink (1960) had already warned us that when we begin to reflect on play, we 
realize  that  we  know  nothing  of  what  we  thought  we  knew  so  well.  Our 
previous  knowledge  appears  as  a  “not-knowing”,  as  something  fragile  and 
illusory.  As  the  philosopher  indicates,  realizing  this  makes  us  uneasy,  and 
shows an ignorance that causes many people to abandon reflection. For others, 
the restlessness of “not knowing” triggers the human will for truth. For others 
still, it triggers the will for philosophy, says Fink. 
To  him  we  can  speak  of  two  games:  the  game  of  the  real,  which  is  a 
phenomenon, and the cosmological game, one that cannot be pointed with a OBRA	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finger, nor be subject to induction, it can only be deduced, as arising from an 
abduction  (Peirce,  2005).  In  this  argumentative  logic,  the  actual  real  play 
would be based on cosmological game, or, as Heidegger (2000) said, games 
exist because we play and not the opposite. 
As a phenomenon, the game is always in the here and now. Thus, we realize 
the  impossibility  to  access  any  game  with  a  previous  absolute  classification. 
Remember: a game can only be called as such when someone enters it, that is, 
when a game is played (Gadamer, 1997), an issue that we work from several 
other  philosophers  (Petry,  2010).  From  the  perspective  of  the  concept  of 
gameplay, Consalvo (2009) also states that a game cannot be thought without 
the action playing and goes one step further when she adds the contexts and 
reasons on which the player's actions occur. Reflecting on what elements are 
part  of  the  game,  when  it  is  being  played,  also  shows  us  a  path  to  game 
analysis, an issue that is not discussed in the scope of this article. 
 From  another  perspective  of  games  as  a  phenomenon,  in  recent  history  of 
digital games we have seen recurring reflection on whether one or another new 
game title may or may not be considered a game. Although scholars on this 
theme struggle to define and put limits on what games are, games themselves 
break the limiting definitions. This is what happened to the game Heavy Rain 
(Quantic Dreams, 2010) and Dan Pinchbeck's Dear Esther. Initially doubted as 
digital  games,  and  subject  of  study  of  scholars,  they  were  subsequently 
included in the games category. 
Fink  (1960),  thinking  the  cosmological  game,  uses  the  story  of  Sophocles, 
Oedipus  the  King,  to  say  that  man  plays  and  is  played.  He  plays  when  he 
knows more than others and, like Oedipus solves the riddle of the Sphinx. He is 
played  when  the  truth  about  himself,  which  he  had  been  looking  for,  is 
revealed. The philosopher, much appreciated by Heidegger and Gadamer, says 
that while playing man no longer remains inside himself. What does he mean 
with this? 
Be them intertwined or adjacent realities, Stenros brings in the teachings of 
Berger  &  Luckmann  (1966)  when  they  speak  of  a  fundamental  reality  of 
everyday life in comparison with the reality of the gaming experience. They 
remember  that  religious  and  aesthetic  experience  is  rich  in  producing 
transitions  and  in  articulating  the  reality  of  everyday  life  with  the  reality  of 
gaming experience. As for the aesthetic experience, we found in Gadamer´s 
Truth and Method (1997), originally published in 1960, an exquisite discussion, OBRA	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previously  announced  by  Schiller  in  Letters  Upon  the  Aesthetic  Education  of 
Man in 1795. In both, the always tensioned encounters between the sensuous 
and reason is highlighted, and this encounter never ceases to happen when we 
have a [genuine] game. 
Well,  history  is  fruitful  in  showing  conceptions  of  delimited  spaces  within 
everyday life, that are capable of transforming social reality. For example, in 
the field of psychodrama, Jacob L. Moreno (1965 apud Stenros) proposed the 
concept of surplus reality, a kind of alternative social reality, in which a group 
can rehearse situations in the life of a participant. It is this dynamic of “role 
play” - a method used to explore unknown worlds or for the expansion of the 
self (Cukier, 2002) - the psychosocial basis for the creation of the characters in 
Role Playing Games. 
 
4. THE MAGIC CIRCLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, THE LIMINAL AND 
THE SUSPENSION OF THE CONTRACT 
Having  discussed  points  that  conceptually  bring  the  magic  circle  and  play 
together, as well as having shown how the boundaries between play and non-
play are blurred and almost non-existent for some, for others, in this topic we 
will  discuss  the  magic  circle  in  a  social  perspective,  relating  it  to  rites  as 
studied in cultural anthropology.  
Klasbebers  (2006  apud  Stenros,  2012)  while  studying  the  magic  circle, 
understands it as a kind of social contract and the game as a formal artifact of 
that social contract. In this approach between the magic circle and play, the 
author  says  the  magic  circle  relates  to  the  rules  and  devices  that  will  be 
triggered  when  the  game  starts.  For  example:  before  starting  any  card  or 
board game it is necessary that the players come to an agreement on the rules 
with which they will play. In digital games, it is part of game design, to have 
the moments (usually early in the game) for learning the rules and properly 
using  controls  or  keyboards,  an  this,  in  our  view,  is  equivalent  to  the 
arrangement of the social contract to start the game. 
According  to  Stenros  (2012),  Montola  understands  the  magic  circle  as  a 
metaphor  and  a  ritualistic  contract.  For  us,  Montola’s  action  in  bringing  the 
relationship of the magic circle with rituals to discussion on digital games was 
very timely and his realization that the magic circle works as a contract that 
prohibits  players  to  bring  external  motivations  and  personal  stories  to  the OBRA	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game world and take game events to everyday life, finds resonance in other 
anthropology  authors,  as  we  shall  see.  In  this  perspective,  the  magic  circle 
boundaries would be much more perceivable than some would think. 
In  order  to  situate  this  issue,  we  will  briefly  review  what  rite  is  and  its 
relationship with play, as well as another key concept for this debate, namely, 
the concept of liminality. 
The  relationship  between  ritual  and  play  appears  in  classical  studies  in 
anthropology, as seen in The Savage Mind by Levi-Strauss (2005). To him, a 
“rite, is also something that is 'played'“ (p. 46). In comparison to a game, it 
seems like a particular and specific kind of game match. That is, the rite begins 
by  exhibiting  asymmetric  relations  between  participants,  and  goes  on  by 
leading  everyone  to  move  to  the  side  of  the  “winners”,  complete  the 
preconceived script of a particular ritual. For Lévi-Strauss, as for the previous 
philosophers mentioned above who discuss the games (Petry, 2010a; Petry, 
2010b), this is characterized by an openness and “a virtually unlimited number 
of  matches”  (p.  46).  Although  participants  begin  with  equal  conditions 
according to the same rules, in the end, we will have an asymmetric relation 
between winners and losers. Having in mind this distinction between ritual and 
play,  we  can  consider  that  both  produce  in  their  participants  unique 
experiences. 
Can we say the same about digital games? Do digital games also allow us a 
virtually unlimited number of matches/experiences? Some would say that they 
only allow us the experiences programmed by the machine (Liebe & Calleja 
apud Stenros, 2012), because they take the game as a closed system in itself. 
Others,  when  they  include  the  player  as  part  of  the  (open)  game  (Aarseth, 
2003)  say  that  human  experience  play  makes  us  perceive  them  as  infinite, 
even making it the reason why we want to play (Petry, 2010a .) Can we still 
think  digital  games  as  a  generic  category?  Or  should  we  define  the  field  in 
specific games or genres to answer these questions? 
We leave these questions open and bring the term liminality into discussion. It 
refers us to the name of Arnold Van Gennep and to Victor Turner's work, being 
the latter primarily responsible for the rescue and popularization of the first 
modern anthropological studies. OBRA	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In order to describe the transition from a culturally defined state or condition to 
another,  Van  Gennep  Arnold  (2011)
16,  used  two  groups  of  terms  in  three 
stages. The first group was composed of: separation, margin and reagregation. 
The second group contained the preliminal, liminal and post-liminal. 
The first group, according to Turner (1974) relates to the structural aspects of 
the passage. Structure, for Turner and the English school of anthropology to 
which  he  belonged,  means  social  structure,  “a  characteristic  disposal  of 
mutually  dependent  specialized  institutions  and  the  organization  of  mutually 
dependent positions of actors and what they imply”
17. 
The  second,  Van  Gennep  applied  to  units  of  space  and  time,  “in  which  the 
behavior  and  symbolism  find  themselves  momentarily  freed  from  the  norms 
and  values  that  govern  public  life  of  the  occupants  of  structural  positions” 
(Turner, 1974, p. 201.) 
The  preliminal  or  separation  phase  covers  the  removal  of  the  individual  or 
group from a point in the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions or 
both. The margin, or “threshold or liminal” phase is the intermediate one and 
the characteristics of the ritual subject are ambiguous in it. It carries few or no 
attributes of the past, and still does not enjoy the future state. In the third 
phase, the passage is completed, returning to lie in a relatively stable state, 
and because of this, has rights and obligations to their social group. 
Individuals or groups in liminal situations “are in the middle and between the 
positions assigned and ordered by law, by custom, convention and ceremonial” 
(1974, p. 117). The liminar phase, when ritualized, is expressed by a variety of 
symbols.  Thus,  “it  is  often  compared  to  death,  to  being  in  the  womb,  to 
invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness and to an eclipse of 
the sun or the moon” (p. 117). 
In the preliminal stages of the ritual, the simplification or elimination of the 
social structure in the British sense and even the amplification of the structure 
in  the  sense  of  Levi-Strauss  (Turner,  1974,  p.  202)  are  frequent.  In  other 
words, social relations simplify themselves while myth and ritual are complex. 
As Turner (p. 202) says: “if liminality is regarded as  a time and a place of 
retreat from the normal modes of social action, it can be seen as a potential 
period of examination of the central values and axioms of the culture in which 
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16 The book was published for the first time in 1909 and was originally called Les Rites de Passage. 
17 For Lévi-Strauss, this is not about structure. What concerns the regulating logical categories is 
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it occurs.” It is in this perspective that we have found some reports of players, 
when speaking of the effects of digital games in their lives. 
When  we  refer  to  subjects,  liminality  is  the  passage  between  'status'  and 
positions. People in the liminal phase “are not here nor there, they are in an 
intermediate stage” and are usually represented as possessing nothing. 
Turner  also  uses  the  term  “liminal  phenomena”  for  moments  that  would  be 
located “in and out of time.” One way to better understand this, would be to 
think of what happens in the rituals of “reversion of status” he studied. The 
individual who is to rise in status, is humiliated by other subjects in the village 
(those  who  will  not  change  their  status).  His  submission  situation  guards 
something sacred, because there is recognition (perhaps a sincere thank you) 
that his future place only exists because others will not leave their places. 
Turner points out that liminal situations frequently attribute characteristics of 
contamination, or danger to those who have not been incorporated into the 
liminal context. It seems that who cannot be classified, and remains on the 
border,  is  considered  dangerous  by  those  in  charge  of  maintaining  the 
structure. 
This  reading  agrees  with  the  trend  indicated  by  Brazilian  anthropologist  Da 
Matta,  of  focusing  the  collective,  consisting  in  “taking  the  symbolism  of  the 
rites  of  passage  as  a  dramatization  of  values,  axioms,  conflicts  and  social 
contradictions” (Da Mata, 2000 p. 12). This trend shows the positivity of liminal 
states for the constitution and arrangement of society itself, a situation that 
involves questioning the marginality and deviations beyond mere criminal or 
pathological behavior. In this perspective, the liminal moments, as pointed out 
by Turner (1974), would have the opportunity to question society itself, since 
its structure would be exposed “upside down.” 
Stenros  (2012,  p.  9-10)  states  that  for  many  authors,  as  Harviainen  and 
Lieberoth, Riezler and Bateson, “the border between play and non-play is not 
just social, but has also a strong psychological element in attention to shared 
intentionality” which we will discuss now. 
5. THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE 
Michael Apter (1991 apud Stenros, 2012) works with the idea of psychological 
bubble,  a  kind  of  small  and  manageable  private  world  that  temporarily 
becomes immune to the outside world. Although it might be a world that can OBRA	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be shared, the sense that it provides is of an enchanted place, protected and 
free  from  threats.  Being  a  psychological  state,  sometimes  a  physical 
representation gives it a frame, such as the outside lines of a soccer field, the 
computer screen or the controls of a video game console (Murray, 2003). In 
other situations,  words have the strength of acts (Austin, 1990) as in fairy 
tales with “Once upon a time ...” (Bettelheim, 1980). Moreover, the rules of 
the game work as idealistic builders of that other reality. 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi does not see games as the sole possessors of flux. For 
him (Stenros, 2012) flow can occur not just fun and games, but also at work. 
However, it is interesting to note that a feature of Csikszentmihalyi’s flow is the 
centralization of attention in a delimited field of stimuli (focus), characteristic of 
what occurs within the magic circle. 
This  detachment  from  everyday  reality  -  that  the  game  provides  –  when  it 
produces liminal people, who are in a position to be more “creative in their 
release of structural controls” (Turner, 1974, p. 5), revealed as potential for 
the human psyche, as time and space for a new structure. 
In  this  way,  one  of  the  interpretative  trends  of  Van  Gennep’s liminality and 
rites of passage, highlighted by Da Matta (2000), situates rites as part of the 
individual  process  of  adaptive  change  of  position  within  a  social  system,  for 
example, the passage from childhood to adulthood. Another way to understand 
it is our need for privacy, of being at a certain distance from intense group 
activity. 
With the experience, both in literature and in computing, Janet Murray (2003), 
starting  from  Turner’s  teachings  (1974),  says  that  computers,  mice,  and 
joysticks  are  liminal  objects
18,  that  bring  us  closer  to  the  concept  of  liminal 
magic  circle.  When  Murray  takes  the  liberty  of  adding  the  notion  of  liminal 
subject and liminal phenomenon, what she calls liminal objects - which act as 
supports of the input and output of the game world - it may be useful to keep 
the concept of magic circle to understand the psychological experience of play.  
In Hamlet on the Holodeck, Murray also uses the term “transitional objects” 
taken from Winnicott (1975), to refer to the characters and events as “real” 
supports of what the player projects from inside. For Winnicott (1975), these 
objects  are  transitional  because  they  are  situated  on  the  border  between 
external  reality  and  our  own  minds,  offering  us  the  security  of  an  object 
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outside ourselves upon which we can project our feelings. So are toys, so are 
games and video games. 
In this perspective, the games, thought of as an object governed by the magic 
circle - while defining material or imaginary and magical space (prefer this to 
the sacred) in which differences between participants are abolished - for more 
than becoming part of everyday life to represent and influence, maintain the 
status of “non-serious activity”
19, as a necessary freedom in the face of rigid 
social structures whenever required by civilization. 
However,  despite  the  psychological  experience  of  a  protective  bubble  that 
enables us to live - like in a rite of passage - a transitory moment, the game 
experience does not pass without consequences to everyday life. 
As the experience of the dream, to some extent, invades our life awake, and 
our life awake is material that has manifestations in our dreams (Freud, 1981), 
games also permeate these two sides of a same structure. When we think of 
the designer, games are at the same time, social expression immersed in a 
more or less universal context and are the expression of a particular mindset. 
When  we  think  of  a  player,  at  the  same  time  that  a  game  expresses  a 
particular idea or proposes an experiment, it is also reorganized from the point 
of view of the player, who obtains his specific and particular experience with 
it
20. 
At  this  point,  we  can  already  perceive  that  the  psychological  formulations, 
different  from  the  social  approaches  to  the  theme,  emphasize 
phenomenological readings. “This helps in explaining why different people have 
differing interpretations of playful situations – or even as to what counts as 
playful – as the protective psychological bubble is not uniform and shared, but 
personal” Stenros writes (2012, p. 11). From here on in this text, the social 
and the psychological will cross. 
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states that "the contrast between play and seriousness is not decisive nor immutable "(p. 8), 
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6. THE MAGIC CIRCLE AS A SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE 
When we think games from an empirical point of view, we find the intersection 
between the personal and the social, as games require rules - although they 
can be personal – these are generally socially shared. However, for the game 
to be possible, all participants must accept the rules. That is a personal choice. 
“Play and ritual are complementary, ethologically based behaviours which in 
humans  continue  undiminished  throughout  life”  says  Stenros  (2012)  on  the 
ideas of Richard Schechner. For the latter, thinking that play is dangerous is 
absolutely central to understanding it. As in rituals, playing is to create multiple 
realities, their own boundaries and kingdoms, a certain kind of “creative lie”. 
As in rituals - when the limits of social structure are temporarily disrupted - the 
games go beyond the limits of everyday life, carrying certain “danger”
21  to the 
social  structure.  This  would  be  the  reason  why  the  player  needs  the  magic 
circle: to feel safe and secure in a (mental or physical) region in which what 
might happen [in the game] will not affect everyday life of society. The fun, the 
fact of having chosen it voluntarily or of participating of an ephemeral activity, 
are psychological “masks” or “disguises” necessary to live the experience as 
fun  instead  of  what,  in  fact,  would  keep  certain  danger.  Anthropology  has 
called this process a ritual. 
What interests us here is to understand that “during the intermediate 'liminal' 
period, the characteristics of the ritual subject are ambiguous”. They are in a 
cultural domain “that has little or almost none of the attributes of the past or 
the  future”  (Turner,  1974,  p.  116-117).  In  this  sense,  the  magic  circle  is  a 
condition of ritual and liminal (phenomenon, object or subject) will function, 
respectively, as an event in a time or space of a subject in transition. 
According to Stenros (2012), the idea that sports and games are safe is deeply 
rooted in the field of game studies and especially in game design. This idea 
leads  us  to  think  of  games  as  separate  from  everyday  life,  and  the  actions 
performed in them have little or no consequences beyond the game session. 
Malaby  (2007,  p.  110),  for  example,  considered  games  as  artifacts,  to 
emphasize that they are not only produced, but also are socially constructed to 
be apart (in varying degrees) from everyday life. However, from an empirical 
point  of  view,  some  games  test  those  limits.  Not  only  RPGs,  as  we  already 
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mentioned,  but  also  the  so-called  pervasive  games  with  their  faint  and 
expanded borders (Andrade, 2012). 
In  a  more  contemporary  anthropological  reading,  Da  Matta  (2000)  makes  a 
connection between the idea of liminality of cultural anthropology and that of 
individualism,  being  the  latter  forged  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century  by 
Tocqueville  and  developed  on  reflections  about  institutions  and  political, 
economic and religious aspects of society. 
Individualism, according to Da Matta, is an ideological construct that is central 
to modern Western culture, which turned out to be “designed in other societies 
and cultures as a universal fact of human experience” (Da Matta, 2000, p. 10). 
As  a  result,  the  individual  is  a  being  endowed  with  independence  and 
autonomy  never  seen  before,  to  the  point  that  he  [the  individual]  becomes 
greater that the society to which he belongs. 
As  Da  Mata  (2000,  p.10)  tells  us,  he  realized  in  his  studies  about  Brazil, 
especially about Brazilian Carnival, the possibility of relating the liminality with 
individuality, what led him to undertake a criticism of anthropological literature 
on the concept of liminality. In his understanding of Turner, unlike ours, he 
perceives liminality to be negative. We, on the other hand, understand that 
Turner (1974, p . 5 ) also perceives in liminality a creative possibility when, for 
example, he  says that “Liminal passages and liminal people (people passing) 
are not here nor there, and are in an intermediate degree. Such phases and 
people can be very creative
22  in their release of structural controls, or may be 
deemed as dangerous from the standpoint of maintaining law and order”.  
While  Da  Matta  (2000)  understands  liminals  can  be  considered  dangerous, 
because they break with the prevailing law and order, our reading understads 
this  potential  danager  as  an  element  that  fosters  creativity.  Backed  by 
Heidegger and Peirce, we defended in our thesis (Petry, 2010a), that risk is an 
element that is present and vigorous in the generation and production of new 
knowledge. 
In  a  Nietzschean  reading,  we  would  say  that  one  needs  Dionysus  -  the 
liberation from  desire and will – for a new process to come into action, but 
would also need Apollo - the order of a form - so that another possibility might 
become present. The desire or impulse leads to the search of disruption from 
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everyday  life,  while  the  transformation  of  the  status  quo  will  require  a 
transgressive organization (as described by Turner when referring to the rituals 
of reverse status). 
For him, the emphasis given by Turner to the anti-structure
23 and rites as a 
denial of rigid social structure, that is, a kind of reaction against the rigidity of 
societies,  is  not  what  best  explains  the  rites  of  passage.  What  would  better 
explain them would be the need, of the collective, of individual and temporary 
seclusion of its members. Here is how he reached this conclusion. 
By studying Brazilian Carnival he realized that it is a festival which at the same 
time  stimulates  domestic  and  hierarchic  rank  competition,  and  at  the  same 
time  adopts  bourgeois  technologies  while  reproduces  an  antibourgeois 
ideological  system,  promoting  anti-puritanism,  in  a  kind  of  temporary 
suspension of social rules. In this festival, “old and routine relationships are 
loosened and [...] [people live] new identities that enable innovative readings 
of  the  world  emerge.  What  helps  to  gain  -  as  with  the  sages,  anchorites, 
shamans, witchdoctors and traditional renouncers – a new and differentiated 
knowledge about society and about the person himself” (Da Matta, 2000, p. 
14). 
However,  its  inner  construction  shows  a  wide  variety  of  Brazilian  cultural 
manifestations  of  every  kind  (food,  sexual,  religious,  racial,  bureaucratic, 
among others) as always in an intermediate or liminal that makes us find in 
Turner and Van Gennep’s liminal not only a temporary state during the time of 
some ritual, but an experience that can be much more common in our society 
and in contemporary Western life. 
What we understand that Da Matta wants to criticize in Turner and Van Gennep 
is the motivation of the rite as a manifestation of opposition to the fixity of 
social  structure:  maybe  society  cannot  in  fact  be  so  rigid,  nor  the  rite  only 
involve contestation, since it aims to restore the previous situation. For him, 
that  would  indeed  be  central  to  the  rite  is  also  described  in  anthropological 
observations by Van Gennep to Turner, is the separation of the young rookie 
the rest of society as a time individualizing. 
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The central thesis of Da Matta is that what truly characterizes the liminal phase 
of rites of passage is the experience of individuality (experienced as a state of 
loneliness, lack, suffering and isolation), whose end is not the removal of the 
person from the group, but the promotion of a renewed encounter with society 
in a triumphant return to take on new roles in it. Many of the myths studied by 
anthropologists say that the acquisition of important elements for the tribe was 
made by characters who have stayed away (voluntarily or not), learned and 
returned as heroes, acquiring a prominent social position : the so-called “hero’s 
journey” described by Joseph Campbell (2004). 
As pointed out by Da Matta in the same text, in the case of tribal characters, 
what is at stake “is not to build a psychologically and existentially autonomous 
being,  but  to  shape  subjectivities  whose  conscience  cannot  do  without  their 
mates  and  masters  of  initiation”  (p.  19).  Would  this  be  the  motivation  in 
modern Western society that makes us focus on ourselves and praise individual 
achievement?  Again,  in  initiation  rites,  the  construction  of  individuality  and 
collectivity reassert each other, and are built by the same set of values. Yet, in 
our  society,  individualization  is  built  highlighting  a  striking  interiority  and  is 
centered in the self. 
I  want  to  suggest  that  the  distinctive  feature  of  liminality  is  the 
segregation  of  a  person  (or  a  class  of  persons,  treated  as  a  social  or 
mystical corporation) of their social ties, releasing them temporarily from 
their  family  obligations,  lineage,  village  or  clan  which  transforms  the 
individual temporarily in an “out-of-world” individual, in people without 
social ties that allow their full social classification and define, thus, their 
obligations to society (Da Matta, 2000, p. 20) . 
In this sense, to play a game, especially single players, and try this “temporary 
removal”, the experience of being “out-of-the-world”, can be (in the manner of 
a liminal experience in ritual) the possibility of the formation of an unusual and 
distinct  social  construct  ,  nurtured  by  the  experience  of  individualization,  of 
being by yourself in the immersive environment of a game. The question is: 
can this experience of isolation better serve society as a locus of being in the 
world, as well as to be of service to the search of freedom and independence 
from others. But under what conditions could the experience of play have this 
“return to the village?” 
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6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The first question, given the debate initiated by game studies, would be to try 
to  answer  if  magic  circle  would  be  a  valid  concept  for  understanding  digital 
games, in which perspective it would still be valid. 
Analyzing the prospects of the object under study as an arena (as space, time 
or product in which the game takes place), as a set of rules established in a 
social contract and as a psychological experience of the player, as proposed by 
Stenros  (2012),  the  understanding  of  magic  circle,  in  our  view,  is  still  very 
useful for understanding the central features of digital games (it is a cultural 
artifact, it occurs in  space  and  time,  it  requires  shared  rules).  We  include  - 
what  is  not  considered  by  all  but  in  the  phenomenological  perspective  is 
indispensable - the Aesthetic experience (Gadamer, 1997) or the production of 
presence (Gumbrecht, 2010), or immersion (Murray, 2003) as an element that 
produces the magic circle, the element that “traces the circle” (Lacan, 1998) of 
the magic circle. Without the player in a given state, the game will not be more 
than digital software. In this vision of digital games, the “magic” idea of the 
magic circle disappears and has nothing to say. 
From the reflections of Da Matta about Van Gennep and Turner, we agree that 
-especially in the contemporary world- what best explains the rites is necessity 
not only of the group, but primarily of the subject (in the psychoanalytic sense 
of  the  term),  of  the  individual  and  temporary  seclusion  of  members.  The 
isolation and solitude open and accentuate an intense inner dialogue, typical of 
modern  individualism,  a  dialogue  glorifying  autonomy,  privacy,  self-
development, socio-centrically taken as the dignity of man, in which the ability 
to remain undivided is a sign of integrity and strength of character. 
Thus,  it  is  the  experience  of  being  “out-of-the-world”  that  engenders  and 
characterizes liminal states and the magic circle, not the other way around. In 
other  words,  liminality  and  its  properties,  as  discovered  by  Turner,  have  no 
power in themselves. But it is the approximation of  liminal states of individuals 
that makes novices become marginal. It is, in a word, the individuality that 
engenders  liminality.  Basically,  the  rites  of  passage  deal  with  transforming 
individuality in complementarity, isolation in interdependency and autonomy in 
immersion  in  the  network  of  relationships  that  the  ordeals,  by  contrast, 
establish as a model for the plenitude of social life (Da Matta, 2000, p.23). OBRA	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Just to recapture: as we already discussed (Turner, 1974, p. 202): “if liminality 
is considered as a time and a place of retreat from the normal modes of social 
action, it can be seen potentially as a period of examination of the core values 
and  axioms  of  the  culture  in  which  it  occurs”,  but  it  can  also  be  seen  as  a 
potential time for the “liminal subject” to examine himself. 
In  modern  societies,  especially  with  the  increasing  complexity  in  the  social 
division of labor and the increasing specialization of society and culture, what 
was  in  tribal  society  a  set  of  transitory  qualities  between  states  became  an 
institutionalized state. With this, liminality proved prone to enter the structure 
and receive a supplement of roles and structural positions (Turner, 1974), for 
example,  in  the  institutionalization  of  adolescence.  With  this  would  we, 
therefore, have lost the characteristic of “life in suspension” of liminality? 
Or  was  it  the  other  way  around:  with  the  uncertainties  of  contemporary 
society,  in  which  living  in  transitional  states  became  something  permanent, 
such as the current situation of unemployment among young people (Canclini 
et al., 2012), do we have just a constant “life in suspension”? And with the 
expansion of digital game genres that blend online and offline life, in which we 
are living in the reality of everyday life (for instance, selling avatars in World of 
Warcraft) and in the reality of the game (conquering items  and  overcoming 
challenges), are we constantly in and out of the magic circle? 
In  our  view,  these  two  realities  are  giving  visible  signs  of  merging,  to  the 
extent that the acceptance of digital games advance in contemporary society 
blurs the boundaries between work and leisure, blurs the boundaries between 
material and immaterial, between the physical body and synthetic one. This 
means we go into and out of the magic circle more often than we previously 
did. At every time we experience the game world within the world of life and 
no  longer  perceive  ourselves  living  in  rigid  and  static  structures,  but  in 
constant and fluid transformation (Bauman, 2007), in other words, in liminal 
states. Likewise, the world of life enters the world of the game as we carry our 
expectations, hopes and desires of our real lives to the game world (Consalvo, 
2009). As Turner wrote in the preface to The Ritual Process: 
The  people  of  the  forest,  of  the  desert  and  tundra  react  to  the  same 
processes as the people of cities, of courts and markets. Revolutions and 
reforms can be studied by employing the same terminology that is used 
to study the cultural products of large and stable civilizations. OBRA	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Despite  the  attraction  that  computers  and  the  narratives  supported  in  them 
have on us, players are rarely completely absorbed by the game, what makes 
the meta-communication about the game possible, that is, the game is open 
and allows an expansion out of it, generating meanings and understandings. In 
this sense, it has reflections in everyday life, although (with the exception of 
pervasive games and that “play/work” in MMOs), they do not act directly on 
reality. With this, we mean that it is no longer possible to think digital games 
as  a  universal  category;  it  is  necessary  to  study  them  starting  from 
themselves. 
A final debt to our reader: in what does the debate on the concept of magic 
circle take us further in defining what play is? 
If we understand the idea of game as a closed system only in terms of a list of 
criteria that are necessary for something to be called a game - then the digital 
game is not what Lévi-Strauss defines as game. That is, the digital game does 
not have limitless possibilities, but what the programming and design allowed 
as possible. 
If we understand that a game in the wake of the phenomenology of Heidegger 
and Gadamer, is only a game when it is played, we need the presence of the 
human  subject  (player),  to  understand  a  game,  since  it  is  he  who  puts  the 
game in action. Thus, Lévi-Strauss is right, because the experience of the play 
will reveal its many interpretive possibilities. 
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